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Representing Partnerships: Who Is/Are the Client(s)?
James M. Fischere

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the more difficult and perplexing legal questions confronting
California lawyers is the issue of client identity when a lawyer represents a
partnership. Resolution of client identity issues is critical because those determinations have a fundamental impact on conflict of interest, confidentiality, and
duty questions. A lawyer who mistakenly believes that a person is not a client,
and acts according to that assumption, may likely find that the mistake has cost
him or her dearly. Client misidentification is a frequent causal link in malpractice
awards since it often results in the lawyer ignoring or even hindering the interests
of a person or entity the lawyer is duty bound to protect and advance. Client
misidentification may also result in attorney disqualification2 or fee forfeiture?
California courts have held that the lawyer who is employed by a partnership
represents (1) the partnership,4 or alternatively (2) the partnership and the general
partners, 5 or alternatively (3) the partnership, the general partners and the limited
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1. See, e.g., Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy v. Boon, 13 F.3d 537, 544 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming
that a failure to identify as a client a person adversely affected by a law firm's representation of another client

cost that law firm $2million).
2.
See Bays v. Theran, 639 N.E.2d 720,725 (Mass. 1994) (holding that a lawyer, who had preliminary
consultations with a prospective client whom the lawyer declined to represent, may not represent party adverse
to the prospective client in the same matter for which the lawyer was consulted by the prospective client). In
In re Marriage of Zimmerman, 16 Cal. App. 4th 556, 565, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 132, 138 (1993), the court, on
similar facts, refused to disqualify counsel. However, recently the California Supreme Court held that a
preliminary consultation between an individual and a lawyer regarding the employment by the individual of
the lawyer could create a lawyer-client relationship. Flatt v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 4th 275, 283, 885 P.2d 950,
954, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 541 (1994); cf. REsTATrmai (TmnRD) OF THE LAW GOVENING LAWYERS § 27
(Tentative Draft No. 5, 1992) (stating that a lawyer's duties to a prospective client are more limited than duties
owed to an actual client).
3.
See Goldstein v. Lees, 46 Cal. App. 3d 614, 618, 120 Cal. Rptr. 253, 255 (1975); see id. (stating
the rule of forfeiture of the lawyer's fee for acts of impropriety inconsistent with the legal profession).
4.
See Responsible Citizens v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 1717, 1731, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756, 76465 (1993) (holding that "[b]ecause of rule 3-600(A), representation of a partnership does not, by itself, create
an attorney-client relationship with the individual partners."). This position was adopted by the State Bar
Committee on Professional Responsibility and Competence in Opinion 1994-137 which relied heavily on the
reasoning of Responsible Citizens.See also ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Opinion 91-361 (1991) (opining that a partnership is an "organization" within the meaning of ABA Model
Rule 1.13(a)); RESTATE4ENT(THIRD) OFTELAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 155, cmt. c (Preliminary Draft No.
10, May 13, 1994) (stating that all partnerships are organizations entitled to separate representation by counsel).
5.
Cf. Woods v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 931,937, 197 Cal. Rptr. 185, 189 (1983) (holding
that a lawyer for a family owned business, corporate or otherwise, should not represent one owner against the
other in a dissolution action).
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partners.6 The decisions are difficult to reconcile. Reconciliation has been

attempted by courts on an issue by issue basis with the lawyer's client base
fluctuating as the issue changes. Thus, a lawyer may have one set of "clients" if
the issue involves conflict of interest, but another set of "clients" if the issue
involves confidentiality. 7 This uncertainty over the fundamental issue of "who is

the client" is unhelpful since the lawyer must necessarily guess ex ante to whom
and to what extent he owes duties of loyalty and due care. After all, the attorney
does not know ahead of time whether a "client" will sue him for malpractice;
move for his disqualification, or claim access to confidential communications
under the joint client or common representation arguments. It is hard to be an
effective advocate when the identity of the client will be determined after the fact
based on issues yet to be determined.
The question "who is the client" is fundamentally one to be resolved in the
retainer agreement. A separate "ethics" rule serves only as a default rule, a rule
to be applied when the retainer is silent. In this setting the question for the rule
draftsmen is what rule serves the public interest when the retainer agreement is
silent. It is the thesis of this paper that an ethical "rule" that a lawyer represents
only a partnership as an entity is a trap for the unwary lawyer who may lose sight

of the larger context in which she acts and in which she creates objectively
reasonable expectations by others that she is their lawyer. When representing a
partnership the lawyer should draft the retainer so that it identifies not only who
are the clients but who are not clients, where failure to do so might engender con-

fusion or ambiguity.8 Similarly, an ethical rule should not encourage confusion
by suggesting that a lawyer has only the partnership entity for a client; rather, the

6. Wortham & Van Liew v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 927, 932-33, 233 Cal. Rptr. 725,728
(1987); see id.
(concluding that legal counsel for the partnership is intended to and does assist each partner in
his management duties). The decisional law outside California reflects the same diversity. See Hopper v. Frank,
16 F.3d 92, 95 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that absent specific circumstances that would dictate otherwise lawyer
represented partnership, not general partner); Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927, 930 (7th
Cir. 1972) (finding that lawyer for unincorporated association represented each constituent member of the
organization); In re McKinney Ranch Assoc., 62 B.R. 249, 255-56 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986) (stating that
representation of general partner will always disqualify attorney from representing limited partners); Wanetick
v. Mel"s of Modesto, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 1402, 1409 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (asserting that a lawyer for a partnership
does not owe a duty to limited partners); Pucci v. Santi, 711 F. Supp. 916, 927 (N.D. II1.1989) (noting that a
lawyer for partnership represented all the partners, general and limited); Rose v. Summers, Compton, Wells
& Hamburg, 887 S.W.2d 683, 686 (Mo. App. 1994) (finding that a lawyer represented partnership, not general
partner).
7. The classification-by-function approach was used by the court in Responsible Citizens, 16 Cal. App.
4th at 1728, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762. The approach has some scholarly support. See John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing
the Lawyer-ClientRelationship,77 CoRNEiLL. REv. 825, 841 (1992). It also has scholarly critics. See Nancy
J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to "Non-Clients": Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client
Relationship in Entity Representationand Other InherentlyAmbiguous Situations, 45 S.C. L. REV. 659, 690-95

(1994).
8. Buehler v. Sbardellati, 34 Cal. App. 4th 1527, 1534, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 104, 108 (1995); see id.
(holding that a lawyer for a partnership consisting of partners who were clients of a lawyer did not have a
conflict of interest where the arrangement clearly manifested that the lawyer represented the partnership in a
limited capacity and the lawyer did not represent the partners in connection with partnership activities).

1995/Representing Partnerships:Who Is/Are The Clients?

ethical rule should reaffirm that, in the absence of a retainer expressly identifying
the client(s), the lawyer's clients are determined by the relationship the lawyer has
in fact with the putative clients and the reasonable expectations which arise out
of that relationship.
II. ENTrrY OR AGGREGATE
There are two competing theories that apply to the issue of client
identification when the lawyer represents an artificial legal construct, such as a
corporation or partnership. The "group" or "aggregate" theory holds that the
lawyer represents both the legal entity and leading individuals who control or
manage the entity.9 The "entity theory" holds that the lawyer represents the entity
alone.'O This approach has been adopted by the American Bar Association in Rule
1.13 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) and by the
California State Bar in Rule 3-600 of the California Rules of Professional
Conduct (California Rules). Indeed, on this point the two rules are substantially
similar. The problem is that neither the Model Rules nor the California Rules
defines the term "entity." Thus, it is unclear whether all fictional legal entities fall
within the Rule or only some "entities," and if the latter what characteristics
separate those "entities" deemed within the Rule from those "entities" deemed
outside the Rule.
Neither the "aggregate" nor "entity" theory provides a perfect solution to the
problem of client identification. Since the entity is a legal fiction, the "client"
cannot consult with the lawyer or give the lawfyer instructions, as would the client
in the traditional lawyer-client relationship. Instead, the person or persons with

whom the lawyer can "consult," e.g., the managers of the entity, are not the
lawyer's clients, and the legal person who is the client cannot directly communicate with the lawyer, except through a person who is not a client. The "entity"
theory separates the client from those who speak for the client, thus complicating
the task of the lawyer who represents the client but not the client's constituents.
The "aggregate" theory probably better reflects the realities of the interpersonal relationships that exist between, on the one hand, the owners and managers
of an artificial legal entity and, on the other hand, the legal agents of the entity,
the entity's lawyer with whom the owners and managers interact. The "aggregate"
theory, however, interposes a norm of "group" representation that is inconsistent
with the idealized individual client model that permeates professional lore and the
professional rules. For example, the rules regarding conflicts of interest treat

9.
GEOFFREY HAZARD &W.WiLLIAMHODES, THELAWOFLAWYERING § 1.13:104 (2d ed. 1990).
10. Id. at § 1.13:102. This approach has been followed by judicial decision in California insofar as the
representation of corporations is concerned. See Meehan v. Hopps, 144 Cal. App. 2d 284, 301 P.2d 10 (1956).
But cf.Woods v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 931, 197 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1983) (ruling that a lawyer for a
"family corporation" represented owners).
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multiple representations as presumptively bad, requiring full disclosure of actual
and potential problems and client consent to the joint representation. No
equivalent disclosure and consent requirements accompany individual representation even though, in some cases, joint representation may be preferable."
Of course, this is not so much ajustification as it is an observation. However, any
set of professional rules must operate under certain assumptions as to how the
professional relationship ought to be structured. Client identification has always
served as a fundamental predicate of the legal profession oriented, as it is said to
be, toward client service. Multiple clients, actual or potential, with the ever
present prospect of diffuse and conflicting interests and goals on the part of the
"clients" are, not surprisingly, viewed by the profession, as arrangements and
relationships between lawyer and clients that are "suspect." As Professor
Wolfram has noted: "[C]onflict of interest problems are probably the most pervasively felt of all the problems of professional responsibility that might haunt
lawyers."' 2 Professor Wolfram goes on to note that "[t]he basic thrust of the
conflict of interest rules is to protect the reasonable expectations of clients with
regard to the loyalty of the client's
lawyer and the confidentiality of the work of
'3
a present or former lawyer.'
The "entity" theory reflects the desirable goal of simplifying client identification. However, the "entity" theory does not avoid all complications associated
with entity representation. While the "entity" theory designates the legal entity as
the client, the theory does not prohibit or bar the lawyer from also representing
constituent members of the legal entity.' 4 In such cases, however, the lawyer must
be cognizant of conflicts of interest and decline conflicted representation or
secure appropriate consent to the joint representation. 5
Finally, the California lawyer must also factor into his or her representation
of a client the possibility that the lawyer may owe a duty of care to a third person,

11. This is reflected, for example, in the literature on the "prisoner's dilemma." See Robert J. Condlin,
Bargaining in the Dark:The Normative Incoherenceof Lawyer Dispute BargainingRole, 51 MD. L. REV. 1,
50-68 (1992) (explaining that, in the prisoner's dilemma, two parties would be better off if they cooperate, but
individual strategies encourage defection and less successful aggregate outcomes than cooperation would
provide). Joint representation facilitates cooperation between represented parties and hampers an adversary's
"divide and conquer" strategy.
12. CHARLES W. WoLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.1.1, at 313 (1986).
13. Id.
14. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(e) (1983); CALIFORNIA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-600(E) (1989).
15. MODELRULES OFPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983); CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3-310(C) (1992); see In re Usow, 349 N.W.2d 480, 482 (Wis. 1984) (disciplining a lawyer for
joint representation of corporation and shareholder where joint representation adversely affected representation
of corporation client); Griva v. Davison, 637 A.2d 830, 844 (D.C. 1994) (holding that a lawyer who
represented partnership and individual partners could be subject to a malpractice claim if lawyer failed to obtain
consent of clients, after full disclosure, to joint representation). In Zador Corp., N.V. v. Kwan, 31 Cal. App.
4th 1285, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 754 (1995), the court addressed what constitutes a valid consent to a joint
representation which presented a conflict of interests. Id. at 1296-97, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 763.
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duty is based
non-client, who is a constituent of the entity. This extra contractual
16
on a collection of factors first articulated in Biakanja v. Irving:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held
liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves
the balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm
to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the
policy of preventing future harm. 17
This factors test was later applied to the legal profession in Lucas v. Hamm"8 with
the added qualification that in this context courts should also consider "whether
recognition of liability . .. would impose an undue burden on the [legal]

profession."1 9 This relatively free floating test can create unwanted surprises for
the lawyer who fails to keep the polestar of client identification clearly in sight. 2°
H.PRIOR APPROACHES

A corporation has a well recognized, distinct existence from its managers and
owners. 21 California courts consistently apply the "entity theory" when lawyers
represent corporations:

16.
17.

49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.

18. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 589, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961),
19. Id.at 589, 364 P.2d at 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824.

cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).

20. More recently, the "factors" test has waxed and waned in scope insofar as the lawyer's duties to
non-clients are concerned and California courts have largely restrained a lawyer's duties to non-clients for
breach of care to intended beneficiaries of the lawyer-client relationship. See, e.g., Pierce v. Lyman, 1 COl.
App. 4th 1093, 1103 n.6, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236,241-42 n.6 (CL App. 1991) (rejecting argument that lawyer for

fiduciary (trustee) owed duty to beneficiary to prevent fiduciary misconduct unless lawyer knowingly
participated in or aided such misconduct); Burger v. Pond, 224 Cal. App. 3d 597, 602, 273 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713
(1990) (rejecting argument that a lawyer owed duty to known, intended wife of client the lawyer was
representing in divorce against client's first wife where the lawyer allegedly mishandled divorce causing
subsequent marriage to be invalid and exposing second wife to emotional distress); Fox v. Pollack, 181 Cal.
App. 3d 954, 957, 226 Cal. Rptr. 532, 533 (Ct. App. 1986) (finding that a lawyer owed no duty to
unrepresented adversaries of his client unless attorney makes contrary representations). See generallyJoan
Teshima, Annotation, What ConstitutesNegligence Sufficient to Render Attorney Liable to Person OtherThan
Immediate Client, 61 A.L.R. 4TH 464 (1988).
21. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 349 (1985)
(recognizing that "[w]hen control of a corporation passes to new management, the authority to assert and waive
the corporation's attorney-client privilege passes as well"); In re WPMK, Inc., 42 B. R. 157, 162 (Bankr. D.
Haw. 1984) (noting that "[wihen an attorney is retained by a corporation, his responsibilities and loyalties are
to the corporation and not to the individual employees, officers, or directors of the company"). See generally
WoLFRAM, supranote 12, §§ 8.3.2 at 421, 13.7.2 at 732.

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 26
An attorney representing a corporation does not become the repre-

sentative of its stockholders merely because the attorney's actions on
behalf of the corporation also benefit the stockholders; as attorney for the
corporation, counsel's first duty is to the corporation... Even where
counsel for a closely held corporation treats the interests of the majority

shareholders and the corporation interchangeably, it is the attorney-client
relationship with the corporation that is paramount for purposes of
upholding the attorney-client privilege against a minority shareholder's
challenge. These cases make clear that corporate counsel's direct duty is
to the client corporation, not to the shareholders individually, even
though the legal advice rendered to the corporation may affect the shareholders.22
Problems of multiple representation in this context arise not because the "entity
theory" is rejected, but arise from the lawyer's conduct which creates the
reasonable expectation that a lawyer-client relationship also exists between the
lawyer and a constituent of the entity.23 This problem is particularly acute in close
corporations where the owner-managers may lack legal and corporate sophistication. 24 In the small business context, lawyers must be aware of and sensitive to
the realities of the interpersonal relationship between the lawyer and close corporation constituents.25 It is for this reason that both the Model Rules and the
22. See Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England & Whitfield, 231 Cal. App. 3d 692,703-04,282 Cal. Rptr. 627,
634-35 (1991) (citations omitted). Even here, however, courts articulating the primary duty to the corporation
rule note that the entity lawyer may have duties to the constituent which, while subordinate to the entity's claim
to the lawyer's services, are superior to the lawyer's ability to represent third parties against the "non-client"
constituent In Meehan v. Hopps, 144 Cal. App. 2d 284, 301 P.2d 10 (1956), the court states that:
[t]he fact that inthe several matters in which counsel represented the corporation what appeared
to be for the benefit of the corporation also was for Hopps' benefit as a principal stockholder and

because of his interest inthe allied companies, did not make counsel his personal attorneys. Ifthis
were true, then the attorney representing a corporation in any given matter becomes the personal
attorney of each stockholder because the attorney's actions benefitting the corporation likewise
benefit the stockholder.
Such relationship would disqualify the attorney from acting adversely to the stockholder
concerningthat particularmatter in any controversy between the stockholderand a thirdparty,
but obviously would not prevent the attorneyfrom representing the corporationin any controversy
between it and the stockholder.
Id at 293, 301 P.2d at 15 (emphasis added). The hierarchial approach can be identified in other contexts. See,
e.g., American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 579, 592, 113 Cal. Rptr. 561,571 (1974)
(observing that while defense counsel retained by the carrier to represent its insured has two clients-the carrier
and the insured-counsel's primaryclient is the insured and the interests of the carrier must be subordinated
to the interests of the insured).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Walters, 913 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1990); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305
F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
24. See, e.g., Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441, 1445 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that "[ilt is indeed
reasonable for each shareholder [in a close 2 person, equally owned corporation] to believe that the corporate
counsel is in effect his own individual attorney").
25. Lawrence E. Mitchell, ProfessionalResponsibilityand the Close Corporation:Towarda Realistic
Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 466 (1989). Informality is most likely the norm when it comes to close
corporations. For example, in Brainard v. De laMontanya, 18 Cal. 2d 502, 116 P.2d 66 (1941) the court
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California Rules specifically admonish the lawyer for the entity to clarify the
lawyer's relationship by telling the constituent who the lawyer's client is." Even
courts adopting the "corporation is the client" rule suggest that the lawyer's
dealings with the corporation's constituents may create a relationship equal to that
between the lawyer and the entity. For example, in Skarbrevik v. Cohen, England
& Whioeld 7 the court distinguished but did not disapprove the Michigan Court
of Appeal decision in Fassihiv. Sommers Schwartz, Silvers, et al.,2 in which the

lawyer represented the entity and a 50% shareholder in the entity but not Fassihi,
the other 50% shareholder.29 The Fassihicourt held that based on Fassihi's claim
that he had confided in the lawyer and trusted him to look after Fassihi's interests
as an owner of the corporation, a fiduciary duty may exist which would have prevented the lawyer from representing the entity adversely to the interests of
Fassihi.30
The Professional Rules and the decisional law lose their certitude when the
entity client is not a public corporation with professional management. The legal
distinctions between the entity and its managers and owners become more difficult to maintain as the sophistication of the managers and owners wanes and as
the willingness of the managers and owners to maintain the formal structure of
the legal entity weakens. This becomes particularly evident when we deal with
partnerships, both general and limited. The reason for this difference in treatment
is most likely due to the greater legal separation between ownership and management that exists in the case of corporate legal entities over partnership legal
entities, 31 coupled with the recognition of the corporation as a distinct and
separate entity for purposes of assigning liability for corporate action, whereas
liability for partnership action is shared by the general partners.32 The different

observed that:
[I]t is immaterial that no formal directors' meetings were held. While it is true that a corporation
ordinarily acts by resolutions which are adopted at formal meetings of its board of directors and are
entered in its minutes, it is also true that decisions reached by all the directors and stockholders of

a closed corporation at informal conferences will be binding upon the corporation when, by custom
and with the consent of all concerned, corporate formalities have been dispensed with and the
corporate affairs have been carried on through such informal conferences.
Id. at 511, 116 P.2d at70.
26. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.13(d) (1983); CALIFORNIA RULES

OF

PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3-600(D) (1989). The approach has been followed by the courts. See, e.g., E.F.

Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 398 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (noting that the burden is on "counsel-not
clients-to search out and disclose potential conflicts between clients and the facts which cause them to arise").
27. 231 Cal. App. 3d at 705,282 Cal. Rptr. at 635-36; see supranote 22 and accompanying text.
28. 309 N.W.2d 645 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
29. Id. at 647-48.
30. IL at 648-49. Fassihiwas distinguished in Skarbrevik on the ground that Skarbrevik did not allege
that he had any dealings with the lawyer that would support the finding of a confidential relationship.
Skarbrevik, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 705, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
31. See infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text (describing the differences, with respect to the
owner's liability, between partnerships and corporations). These concerns have led to the creation of a new
entity: the limited liability company (LLC) designed to provide limited liability for its owners but retain the
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legal status of artificial legal entities, as amongst themselves, may have
influenced courts to treat the entities differently when the issue of client status

arose.
The Discussion comment to Rule 3-600 of the California Rules begins with

the observation that "Rule 3-600 is not intended to enmesh members in the
intricacies of the entity and aggregate theories of partnership. '33 The observation
is remarkable because resolving that "intricacy" is central and fundamental to
identifying who is the lawyer's client. That is, after all, the primary theme of the
Rule. 34 The Discussion comment's statement of ambivalence regarding partnerships as clients is thus particularly ironic given the Rule's purpose of client identification. The Rule's ambivalence is, however, shared by the courts.35 It is also
reflected in the perception that client identity issues are influenced by the nature
of the legal issue presented, for example, whether the issue is client confidentiality concerns or conflict of interest concerns.3 Lastly, the ambivalence is
compounded by the frequency with which the client identity issue in the partnership representation context is joined by issues regarding the lawyers duties to
non-clients either under a duty theory 37 or an assistance theory. 38 Since in all these
cases the end result is the conclusion that the lawyer should have done something
to avoid the infliction of injury on someone else, it is important to determine if
that someone else is, or is not, a client. Several of the cases have been further
complicated by the fact that the lawyer acted in a dual role as lawyer and as a

benefits of partnership for federal tax purposes. A number of states, including California (as of January 1,
1995), have enacted legislation permitting LLCs. See Timothy M. Harris, Review of Selected 1994 California,
26 PAC. L.J. 202, 305 (1995) (discussing the authorization of LLCs in California by Senate Bill 469, Chapter
1200 of the 1994 statutes, and also noting the previous authorization of LLCs in 43 other states). See generally
Mary Mathews, The Arkansas Limited Liability Company: A New Business Entity is Born, 46 ARK.L. REV.
791, 796-800 (1994) (discussing the historical development of LLCs). A variant of the LLC is the LLP or
limited liability partnership. An LLP is a partnership for tax purposes; however, the partners are exposed only
to limited liability for the errors and omissions of other partners. There is, as of the writing of this paper, no
decisional law specifically addressing the issue of representation of an LLC or LLP.
33. CALIFORNA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 3-600 cmt. (1988).
34. CALnORNIARLES oF PROFESStONAL CoNDucr Rule 1-600(A) (1988); see id. ("In representing an
organization, a member shall conform his or her representation to the concept that the client is the organization
itself....").
35. For example, the court in Epstein v. Frank, 125 Cal. App. 3d 111, 177 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1981) opined
that:
The authorities do not clearly delineate when a partnership will be regarded as an aggregate of
individuals and when it will be considered as a separate entity. An analysis of the case demonstrates
that the concept to be utilized in any given case is dependent largely upon policy considerations and
upon which concept will achieve a fair and equitable disposition of the issues in controversy.
Id. at 119, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35.
36. See Responsible Citizens v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 1717, 1728,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 756,762
(1993).
37. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
38. See Pierce v. Lyman, I Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1105-06, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236, 243 (1991); see id.
(discussing liability of lawyer for aiding and abetting client trustee's breach of trust).
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general partner,3 9 thus raising issues of duty to others (the limited partners) from
other substantive areas of the law but where the nature of the duty is similar to
that imposed by the lawyer-client relationship.
IV. THE FAILED SYNTHESIS

In the recent decision in Responsible Citizens v. SuperiorCour ° the court
attempted to bring order to this chaos. The court found that the prior diverse
California precedents on the issue of whom the lawyer represents in the partnership context could be reconciled with a finding that the lawyer's retention solely
by a partnership resulted in the lawyer having only one client-the partnership. 4'
Whether or not the lawyer also had a lawyer-client relationship with constituent
members of the partnership, such as general and limited partners, depended on the
lawyer's conduct with respect to those individuals. 42 This determination required
a case-by-case analysis. In effect Responsible Citizens holds that mere retention
of a lawyer by a partnership creates a lawyer-client relationship between the

entity and the lawyer but without more does not create a lawyer-client relationship
between the lawyer and the entity's constituent(s). In this sense the court
reconciled and equalized the application of Rule 3-600 to both corporations and
partnerships.
Responsible Citizens has proven to be influential. The State Bar Committee
on Professional Responsibility and Conduct relied on Responsible Citizens in
rendering a Formal Opinion finding that partnerships were entities under Rule 3-

39. See Kapelus v. State Bar, 44 Cal. 3d 179,745 P.2d 917,242 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1987) (finding that the
lawyer served as general partner and as lawyer for partnership). Kapelus did articulate the principle that the
lawyer for the partnership represented the entity and not, without more, the general and limited partners.
Kapelus was, however, a bar discipline matter and the facts were highly unusual. All the individual partners
had retained separate counsel and it was understood by the individual partners that Kapelus' role was to serve
as a "watchdog" for a lender who had made a substantial loan to the partnership. Id. at 192-93, 745 P.2d at 92425, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 203-04. Kapelus' unique facts diminish the likelihood it can single-handedly support
application of the entity rule to partnerships.
40. 16 Cal. App. 4th 1717,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d756 (1993).
41. Responsible Citizens, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1731,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 765. The retainer agreement can,
of course, provide that the lawyer will also represent the individual interests of one or more of the partnership's
constituents. This would expressly create a joint client situation. The problems in this area, however, are
implied attorney-client relationships arising out of the interactions between the lawyer and the entity's
constituents and the objectively reasonable expectations that such interactions create in the mind of the
constituents.
42. Id. at 1733, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 766. Since the relationship a lawyer has with a partnership entity's

constituents iscase specific and context driven, no bright-line rule could be applied. The court determined that

a multi-factors approach should be used which included: the type and size of the partnership, the nature and
scope of the attorney's engagement by the partnership, the kind and extent of contacts, if any, between the
attorney and the individual partner, and the attorney's access to information (e.g., partnership financial
information) related to the individual partner's interest. Id.
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600.43 The California Supreme Court's depublication of Ronson v. Superior

Court,44 a decision that questioned the holding of Responsible Citizens, will also
add to Responsible Citizens' decisional weight. Nevertheless, Responsible
Citizens contains analytical flaws that weaken its persuasiveness. Moreover, by
failing to recognize the inherent structural differences between corporate and
partnership management, the decision may encourage .lawyers to place
unwarranted reliance on their perceived status as lawyer for the partnership only.
Indeed, Responsible Citizens may be justly faulted for assuming that the entity
rule, which works relatively well when applied to public, professionally managed
corporations, should be applied to non-public organizations such as partnerships.
The wide differences between fictional legal entities suggests that here is a

situation where one rule, just like one size, does not always fit all.
Responsible Citizens arose out of the disqualification of a law firm from
representing Responsible Citizens, a California not-for-profit corporation. The
law firm filed a lawsuit on behalf of Responsible Citizens against several defendants, including David and Karen Askins. At the same time the law firm represented, in an entirely different matter, a partnership in which Karen Askins was
a general partner. The trial judge disqualified the law firm based solely on the
determination that an attorney-client relationship existed between the law firm
and Karen Askins because she was a member of the partnership that had retained
the law firm.45 Because both the relationship with Karen Askins and the relation-

43. California Bar Ass'n Committee on Prof. Resp. and Conduct, Formal Op. 137 (1994). The Formal
Opinion cites only Responsible Citizens for the proposition that the lawyer for the partnership has only one
client under Rule 3-600. The Opinion implicitly accepts the reconciliation of prior precedent attempted in
Responsible Citizens.
44. 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 268 (review denied and ordered depublished pursuant to Rule 976, July 14, 1994).

In Ronson the Court of Appeal held that counsel for a-limited partnership owed a duty of care to the limited
partners:
[I]n the case before us, the attorney defendants gave advice to the general partner (or the
partnership) expressly for the purpose of enabling the client to discharge a fiduciary duty of
disclosure to the limited partners. We believe this factor raises triable issues of fact as to the
existence of attorney-client duties as implied from the circumstances and imposed by public policy.
Even disregarding the issue of whether the general partner had any wish to confer a benefit upon
the limited partners by engaging the attorney defendants' services (since we need not use any third
party beneficiary theory here), some duty to protect their interests to some degree may be implied
as a matter of law.
Id. at 279. The court also noted: "[S]ince the attorney defendants advised the fiduciary about his duty of
disclosure to the limited partners, they may have undertaken some kind of duty to protect those interests." Id.
As the excerpted materials indicate the Ronson court relied heavily on the principle that a lawyer for a fiduciary
owes duties to the beneficiary. See REsTATEMAENT OFTHE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73(4)(b) (Preliminary
Draft No. 7, 1994). This proposal, ainong others, generated substantial criticism when it was considered at the
ALI Annual May meeting in 1994. The Reporters were instructed to reconsider the proposal. Whether similar
concerns influenced the California Supreme Court is unknown because the order for depublication is done

without the stating of reasons by the court.
45. Responsible Citizens, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1723,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759.
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ship with Responsible Citizens overlapped, a current client conflict existed 4 6-- if
the trial court was correct that the firm had a lawyer-client relationship with
Karen Askins.
The Responsible Citizens court held that the lawyer representing the partnership may, but does not, necessarily, represent its members simply because she
represents the partnership.4 7 The court held that any representation of members
of the partnership must arise either from an express contract, or out of the conduct
mind of the partof the lawyer that creates the reasonable expectation in the
48
exists.
relationship
lawyer-client
a
that
constituent
nership
The court distinguished prior precedents that had recognized or been said to
recognize that the lawyer for the partnership represented the partnership
constituents. The first case, Woods v. Superior Court,49 involved a marital dissolution proceeding. The lawyer for the husband also represented the closely held
corporation owned by the marital partners. The wife moved to disqualify the
lawyer. The appellate court affirmed the disqualification.
The Responsible Citizens court first distinguished Woods on the ground that:
Woods involved a controversy between the two owners of a closely held
business, which was referred to as the "focus" of the marital dissolution
(Woods, supra, 149 Cal. App. 3d at p. 936). Here the controversy is
between one owner of the business and a third party, and the business
itself is completely uninvolved in the controversy and the action. 0
The distinction would be meaningful if the conflict in Responsible Citizens

involved a former client and the court was attempting to ascertain the relationship
between the first representation in which the lawyer represented the former client
and the second representation in which'the lawyer represents a client adverse to
the former client. In such a case, a substantial relationshipe 5 ' between the two

46.

See CALIFORNIA RULES OFPROFESSIONALCONDUCT Rule 3-310(C) (1988).

A member shall not, without the informed written consent of each client: ... (3) Represent a client
in a matter and at the same time in a separate matter accept as a client a person or entity whose
interest in the first matter is adverse to the client in the first matter.
Id.; see also MODELRULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1987).
47. Responsible Citizens, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1721, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758.
48. Id. at 1732-33, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 765-66.
49. 149 Cal. App. 3d 931, 197 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1983); see Responsible Citizens, 16 Cal. App. 4th at
1726,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 761 (discussing Woods).
50. Responsible Citizens, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1726, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 761 (citation omitted).
Unfortunately, courts occasionally miss or ignore inconvenient precedent. For example, in Sharbrevik v.
Cohen, England & Whitfied, 231 Cal. App. 3d 692, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1991) the court did not cite or discuss
the Woods holding that a lawyer for a 'Tamily corporation" represents the owners; instead, Skarbrevik held that
a lawyer for a "close corporation" represents only the entity. Thus, in California, characterization of the
corporation as "family" or "close" may determine the lawyer's clients, which, of course, is absurd.
51. "Substantial relationship" is perhaps more a term of art than a legal rule. Courts have created a
number of tests to determine if two matters are sufficiently related to warrant disqualification of counsel. In
Analytical, Inc. v. N.P.D. Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1266-67 (7th Cir. 1983) the court construed
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representations raises a conflict of interest because the court will presume that any
confidential, material information obtained by the lawyer in the first representation will be used against the former client in the second representation5 2 If
a conflict existed in Responsible Citizens, it involved a current client conflict
because the lawyer would be representing a partner (Karen Askins) and a party
adverse to Askins-the not-for-profit entity, Responsible Citizens. Representing
directly adverse parties is a current client conflict under both the California and

American Bar Association's Rules of Professional Conduct. 3 In this setting the
relationship between the two matters is irrelevant because the concern in current

client conflicts is for client loyalty;S whereas, the concern in the former client
conflict context is for protection of client confidentiality 5 Woods was factually
distinguishable in the sense that in Woods the common lawyer was representing
both sides in the same proceeding, whereas in Responsible Citizens the common
lawyer represented clients in separate proceedings who opposed each other in one
of those proceedings. That factual distinction might influence the waiveability of
the conflict, 56 but it does not influence the determination of who the lawyer
"substantially related" in terms of access and rele,'ance: "the lawyer could have obtained confidential
information in the [former] representation that would have been relevant in the [current representation]." In
Evans v. Artek Systems, 715 F.2d 788, 791 (2d Cir. 1983) the court said that the comparison should be over
the "issues" involved in the two representations; the common issues should be "identical" or "essentially the
same." In addition, the lawyer should have "access" to the former client's confidential information. In Carlson
v. Langdon, 751 P.2d 344,349 (Wyo. 1988) the court adopted a self-defining test for "substantial relationship,"
emphasizing whether "in the factual context the matters involving the [current and former clients] are related
in some substantial way." In H.F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Solomon Bros., Inc., 229 Cal. App. 3d 1445,280 Cal.
Rptr. 614 (Ct. App. 1991) the court adopted a balancing approach using several guidelines or standards. These
included: (1)The factual similarities between the two representations; (2) the issue similarities between the two
representations; and, (3) the nature and extent of the lawyers' involvement in the prior representation, as
determined by (a) time spent, (b) type of work performance and (c)the lawyers exposure to formulation of
policy or strategy. Id. at 1456-57, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 620-21.
52. Western Continental Operating Co. v. Natural Gas Corp. of Calif., 212 Cal. App. 3d 752, 759-60,
261 Cal. Rptr. 100, 103-04 (1989); see infra note 55.
53. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3-310(c)(3) (1988); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1987). See generallyFlatt v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 4th 275, 284-85, 885
P.2d 950, 955-56, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 542-43 (1994).
54. See Flatt, 9 Cal. 4th at 284, 885 P.2d at 955, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 542 ("The primary value at stake
in cases of simultaneous or dual representation is the attorney's duty-and the client's legitimate
expectation-of loyalty....
").
55. Id. at 283, 885 P.2d at 954,36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 541; see id. ("[W]here the potential conflict is one
that arises from the successive representation of clients with potentially adverse interests, the courts have
recognized that the chief fiduciary value jeopardized is that of client confidentiality." [emphasis in original]).
56. Although the professional codes treat all
client conflicts as waiveable through client consent to the
joint representation, courts have deemed some conflicts as irreconcilable and not subject to waiver. In many
of the cases dealing with non-waiveable conflicts the concern may be that no informed consent could ever
reasonably be given. See, e.g., In re McKinney Ranch Ass'n, 62 B.R. 249, 255 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986)
(finding that representation of general partner will always disqualify an attorney from representing limited
partners); Sapienza v. New York News, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 676, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (dictum) (stating that
when lawyer attempted to represent two clients with likely claims against each other, consent could not cure
conflict); Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 899, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509, 513 (1977) (suggesting that
lawyer could not represent both parties in a contested child support hearing); Kelly v. Greason, 244 N.E.2d
456,462 (N.Y. 1968) (disqualifying law firm from representing both insurer and claimant under policy). Nonwaiveable conflicts also arise in settings where it is difficult to identify either the client or who "speaks" for
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represents. The Responsible Citizens court's analysis here was simply wrong.
Responsible Citizens and Woods are simply inconsistent on the issue of whom is
the client. Reconciliation simply fudges the issue.
The Responsible Citizens court then cited and discussed Meehan v. Hopps57
for the proposition that the lawyer for the corporationrepresents the corporation,
not the constituents. As the Responsible Citizens court noted this is the general
rule.58 The fact that the corporate representation rule is well recognized simply
begs the question, however, whether the same rule should be applied to fictional
legal entities other than corporations. 59 It is in this area of close corporations,
unincorporated associations, unions, and partnerships, that courts have split. It is
the presence of the formal structure found, or assumed to exist, in corporations
that supports the corporate representation rule. The recognition by corporate constituents that the corporation has a legal existence separate from its owners and
managers has also been noted by courts as justifying the corporate representation
rule. 60 It is the absence or minimization of corporate structure and the attributes
of separateness and awareness of separateness that have caused courts to split on
the issue of the lawyer's client(s) in the non-corporate context. The issue cannot
be resolved by ignoring the factors that created the issue in the first place. That,

unfortunately, is the path the Responsible Citizens court took.
The Responsible Citizens court next examined several decisions "holding
that, with respect to attorney-client privileged communications, an attorney for
an unincorporated association is considered to represent the association's in-

dividual members." 6 ' The court acknowledged broad language stating that the
lawyer for the partnership "represents all the partners as to matters of partnership

the client. Who, for example, "waives," a conflict for government lawyers? CompareIn re A&B, 209 A.2d
101, 103 (N.J. 1965) (stating it was improper for municipal attorney to represent land developer because public
may not give consent to conflict); with City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp.
193, 212 (N.D. Ohio 1976), aff'd 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978) (allowing
as a waiver the consent of city to otherwise conflicted lawyer); see also Alabama Bar Association Ethics
Opinion RO-84-120. In Flatt,9 Cal. 4th at 285 n.4, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 543 n.4, 885 P.2d at 956 n.4, the court
suggestet a conflict arising out of the representation of directly adverse clients but in unrelated actions might
be waiveable.
57. 144 Cal. App. 2d 284,301 P.2d 10(1956).
58. Responsible Citizens, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1727,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762; see id. (citing California
cases except contrary California authority); see also supra note 50 (highlighting the possible confusion in
California cases involving close or family corporations). "The corporation as client" is also the rule outside
California. See PAuL RICE, ATrORNEY-CL ENTPRPIUv.EGEINTHEUNrrED STATES, § 4:10 (1993) (noting general
judicial refusal to accept the argument that a corporation should not be able to assert the lawyer-client privilege
as to communications involving its employees and its lawyers). However, in close corporation contexts, the
rule is less certain. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 221-22 (2d ed. 1992) (noting split in the law when
the issue of client identity involves "close" corporations).
59. AERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 58, at 22223; see id. (noting split in authorities when client identification involves legal entities other than corporations).
60. Meehan, 144 Cal. App. 2d at 290-92, 301 P.2d at 14-15.
61. Responsible Citizens, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1727,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762.
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business... ,,62 The court held that these decisions, and their accompanying
language, were not applicable to the problem before the court because the policy
considerations underlying the lawyer-client privilege are not identical with those
behind the conflict of interest rules: 63
[T]he basis for the rule against representing conflicting interests is
broader than the basis for the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The
evidentiary privilege and the ethical duty not to disclose confidences both
arise from the need to encourage clients to disclose all possibly pertinent
information to their attorneys, and both protect only the confidential
information disclosed. The duty not to represent conflicting interests, on
the other hand, is an outgrowth of the attorney-client relationship itself,
which is confidential, or fiduciary, in a broader sense. Not only do clients
at times disclose confidential information to their attorneys; they also
repose confidence in them. The privilege is bottomed only on the first of

these attributes, the conflicting-interests rule, on both.64
The points raised in the excerpt are legally correct, but they have no relevance to
the issue; indeed, the Responsible Citizens court never attempts to explain how
the distinction between the underlying values of the lawyer-client privilege and
the conflict of interest rules addresses the issue before the court which is client
identification. One would think that the issue of client identification is analytically
prior to determining whether confidential disclosures were made by the "client"
or whether the "client" reposed confidence in the lawyer.
Perhaps the court understood the lawyer-client privilege cases to reflect
situations where a non-client discloses confidential information to the lawyer. The
most common example of this is the interview of the prospective client. Even if
the lawyer declines to accept the representation and no lawyer-client relationship
is formed, the lawyer is obligated to maintain the confidences disclosed. 5 This
may include declining subsequent representation which would require the use of
the confidences in the competent representation of the new client. 66 As thus conceived, the court may have seen the lawyer-client privilege cases as not involving
a client so much as involving a duty to maintain confidences even as to one who
is not a client. As so characterized, the lawyer-client privilege cases do not neces-

62. Id.; see id. (quoting Wortham & Van Liew v. Super. Ct., 188 Cal. App. 3d 927, 932,233 Cal. Rptr.
725,728 (1987)).
63. Id. at 1728, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762.
64. Id.; see id. (quoting E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371,394 (S.D. Tex. 1969)),
65. Beery v. State Bar, 43 Cal. 3d 802, 811,739 P.2d 1289, 1293,239 Cal. Rptr. 121, 125 (1987); see
id. (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir. 1978), in that
"[t]he fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client extends to preliminary consultations by a

prospective client with a view to retention of the lawyer, although actual employment does not result").
66. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3-310(E) (1988); see supra note 2 and
accompanying text (noting the possibility of disqualification).
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sarily establish the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between the partnership's lawyer and the partnership's constituents whose communications may be
privileged.
This approach distinguishes between positive and negative duties that may
be owed by a lawyer. Positive duties are owed by the lawyer to the client in the
sense that the lawyer must act affirmatively to advance the client's legal interests.
The lawyer's negative duties prohibit the lawyer from harming the client's
interests. Positive duties are owed to clients, but negative duties may be owed to
non-clients, and may preempt positive duties owed to clients. For example, the
lawyer must refrain from taking advantage of unrepresented parties even though
doing so may advance the client's interests. The prospective client cases also
illustrate this positive-negative distinction. The lawyer owes the "prospective but
not retained client," i.e. the declined "client," a duty of confidentiality but no
to the
positive duty of assistance. 67 If however the lawyer does provide assistance
68
assistance.
competent
provide
must
lawyer
declined "client," the
Distinguishing between positive and negative duties may help us understand
the limited nature of some cases finding a lawyer-client relationship but the terms
are not talismanic. First of all, the labels are hardly precise. Second, and more
importantly, a lawyer may find that negative duties owed to an individual actually
or potentially conflict with positive duties owed to another person. When that
other person is a potential client, the lawyer should decline the representation;

when that other person is a present client, the lawyer may be required to
withdraw-and withdrawal may be backed up by disqualification if withdrawal
is not forthcoming.
All this means is that the lawyer-client privilege cases, discussed in
Responsible Citizens, may be supported under a theory other than that a lawyerclient relationship existed between the lawyer and the entity constituent. Each
case would, however, have to be analyzed on its facts and its reasoning to see if
that alternative theory was the true animating force behind the court's holding that
a lawyer-client relationship existed. The Responsible Citizens court attempted no
such analysis. Rather, it simply substituted its alternative theory for the actual
holdings in prior California decisions holding that the lawyer for the partnership
also had a lawyer-client relationship with the partnership constituency. That

67. One caveat here is that the lawyer may owe the declined "client" the positive duty of informing that
person that the statute of limitation may be running on the claim for which the person wished representation.
Even here, however, the lawyer may have no positive duty. For example, the lawyer may represent the potential
defendant and "advice" to the declined client would be inconsistent with duties owed to the existing client. See
Flatt v. Super. Ct., 9 Cal. 4th 275, 290, 885 P.2d 950, 959, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 546 (1994) (holding that a
lawyer did not have duty to provide advice to a declined, prospective client that would harm a current client).
68. Miller v. Metzinger, 91 Cal. App. 3d 31,42, 154 Cal. Rptr. 22,29 (1979); see id. (holding that a
failure by a lawyer declining representation to inform the client of a statute of limitations problem is a breach
of duty); see also Togestad v. Vesely, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693 (Minn. 1980) (affirming damages
for the lawyer's failure, on telling the client she had no case, to also inform her he was not an expert in the
relevant area and that she should seek advice elsewhere).
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failure to take the extra step to support factually
its thesis substantially weakens
69
Citizens.
Responsible
of
persuasiveness
the
The Responsible Citizens court's effort to distinguish the partnership conflictof-interest cases also fails for the same reason its distinguishing of Woods fails:
the Responsible Citizens court applied principles used in cases involving former
client conflicts to a case involving current clients conflicts. The Responsible
Citizens court suggested that Wortham & Van Liew is distinguishable because of
language in the Wortham & Van Liew opinion that: "In the context of the
representation of a partnership, the attorney for the partnership represents all the
partners as to matters of partnership business .... '[L]egal counsel provided to
the partnership is intended to and does assist each and every general partner to
fulfill his joint management duties."' 70
The Responsible Citizens court construed this language as creating a
"relatedness" test:
Because the quoted language limits the attorney's representation of
individual partners 'to matters of partnership business' and to assisting

the partner in fulfilling 'his joint management duties,' it does not support
the disqualification order here. The CUP 2488 matter is not related to
Westside business, and there is no conflict between Karen Askins'
partnership management duties and H & G's representation of Citizens.7'
"Relatedness" has significance if we are dealing with former client conflicts
but not with current clients. Yet, the Responsible Citizens court acknowledged
that both Responsible Citizens and Karen Askins were clients of the law firm.72
The Responsible Citizens court took the Wortham & Van Liew court's statement of what lawyers do-advise clients-and elevated it to the ratio descendi,
if not the holding of the case, in complete derogation of what the Wortham & Van
Liew court said was the basis of its holding-the existence of a lawyer-client

69. None of the decisions Responsible Citizensdistinguishes discuss the alternative theory ascribed to
them by the Responsible Citizens court.
70. Responsible Citizens, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1727,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 762; see id. (citing Wortham &
Van Liew v. Super. Ct., 188 Cal. App. 3d 927,932-33,233 Cal. Rptr. 725,728 (1987)).

71. Id. The "CUP 2488" reference was to the litigation for which disqualification was sought of
Responsible Citizens' lawyers. Id. at 1721-22, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 758-59.
72. Id. at 1727-28, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 762; see id. ("It could be argued that Wortham, because of its
limiting language, is implied authority that Karen Askins was not H & G's client for any purpose outside the
partnership sphere. We do not accept Wortham as persuasive authority for that proposition ....
). The
Responsible Citizens court suggested that the representation of Karen Askins was limited as to the partnership's
(Westside) business. Id. at 1735, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 767. The court failed to explain how that made a difference
in a current client conflict. It is the status of clients as adverse that raises the conflict, not the subject matter
of the representation. See Jeffrey v. Pounds, 67 Cal. App. 3d 6, 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. 373, 376 (1977) ("[A] lay
client is likely to doubt the loyalty of a lawyer who undertakes to oppose him in an unrelated matter...."); see
also supranote 56 (discussing the treatment by courts of the waiveability of current clients conflicts).
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relationship extended to "all the partners." The Responsible Citizens court read
both too much into a description and too much out of the holding of Wortham &
Van Liew to pass muster.73
The Responsible Citizens court also sought help in Rule 3-600(A) of the
California Rules of Professional Conduct which holds that a lawyer in
representing an organization represents only the organization, not its constituent
members. The question was whether a partnership is an organization under Rule
3-600(A). The court held that Rule 3-600(A) encompassed partnerships:
Although the rules do not define the term 'organization,' its common,
ordinary meaning is sufficiently broad to include partnerships. The
pertinent dictionary definition of 'organization' is 'any unified, consolidated group of elements; systematized whole; esp., a) a body of per-

sons organized for some specific purpose, as a club, union, or society.'
(Webster's New World Dict. (3d college ed. 1988) p. 954). A partnership
is 'an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for profit.' (Corp. Code, § 15006, subd. (1)). In addition, the
rule refers to the highest authorized 'constituent' of the organization. A
'constituent' is a component. (Webster's, op. cit. supra, p. 298.) We have
no doubt that a partner is a component, and therefore a constituent, of a
partnership. 74
In effect, the court reasoned that an organization is a body of persons
organized for some specific purpose; a partnership is designed to carry on a
business as its purpose; therefore, a partnership is an organization. This form of

73. The fact that the attorney-client relationship protects a communication between a lawyer and a
person does not mean that a lawyer-client relationship exists between the lawyer and that person. See, e.g.,
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981) (finding that the attorney-client privilege protects
communications between corporate lawyer and corporate employees and that the corporation, as client, is
holder of the privilege); cf. In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 939-40 (8th Cir. 1994) (determining that
communications between lawyer for partnership and consultant were protected by attorney-client privilege
notwithstanding consultant was neither client nor employee of client). However, the facts that give rise to the
privilege, here the expectation of confidentiality, may also support a person's claim that he reasonably believed
that a lawyer-client relationship existed.
74. Responsible Citizens, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1729-30, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 763-64. The court treated
the issue as so self evident that it created a reverse presumption, requiring evidence that Rule 3-600(A) was
intended to exclude partnerships rather than demanding evidence that the rule was intended to include
partnerships: "Without belaboring the point, we see nothing in the text of Rule 3-600(A) evidencing an intent
to exclude partnerships from its ambit." Id. at 1730, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764.
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reasoning represents the fallacy of the undistributed middle. The error is
obvious if we compare the court's argument with a simpler form:
All dogs are mammals.
All cats are mammals.
Therefore, all cats are dogs.76
The failure lies in the fact that the first proposition ("an organization is a body of
persons organized for some specific purpose"; "all dogs are mammals") does not
encompass a larger universe than the second proposition ("a partnership [has] a
business purpose"; "a cat is a mammal"). Because of this the conclusion does not
necessarily follow from the preceding propositions (premises). Put another way,
ajoint venture has a business purposes, but we do not necessarily say that a joint
venture is an organization, for purposes of representation, separate and distinct
from its constituents. 77 If a partnership is an organization for purposes of the

"lawyer for an entity" rule it must be for reasons other than that the partnership

has a business purpose.
V. THE RESPONSIBLE CITIZENS' TRAP

The Responsible Citizens court did not hold that constituents of an entity
could not be clients of the entity's lawyer; rather, the court held that they were not
clients simply because (1) the lawyer represented the partnership and (2) they
were the owners of the partnership. 7 The constituents could become the partnership's lawyer's clients if such a relationship were "created by some form of
contract, express or implied, formal or informal." 79 Given the informal nature of
partnership management, it may be expected that lawyer-constituent client
relationship will be common. As noted by one commentator:
Further complicating the cases which directly address the existence of an
attorney-client relationship is the prevalent view that the relationship is

75. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS 147-54 (1989). I do not mean to suggest that the
Responsible Citizens court deliberately engaged in syllogistic reasoning. The form of reasoning was syllogistic
and, perhaps, like the fictional character of yore, the court might be pleased to know that it had been engaged
in syllogistic reasoning ["speaking prose"] without knowing it. See MOLIERE, LE BOURGEOIS GENTILttOMMI
(1670), act II, sc. 4, quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILAR QUOTATIONS 361b (14th ed. 1968) ("Good Heavens!
For more than forty years I have been speaking prose without knowing it.").
76. ALDISERT, supranote 75, at 149.
77. AmERicAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, supra note 58, at 223;
see id. ("[S]ome courts have considered... [a] joint venture.., to be an aggregate of individuals rather than
an entity...."). HAZARD & HODES, supra note 9, at § 1.13:103, at 390.1-.2 (suggesting that it may be
appropriate to treat even informally organized groups as entities for representational purposes); id.(providing
an example of a situation where a group of homeowners form primarily for the purpose of retaining counsel).

78. Responsible Citizens, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1731, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 765.
79. Id. at 1732,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 765 (citations omitted).
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'fundamentally a contractual relationship,' in which the law looks
primarily to the actual intentions of the parties, whether express or implied. Unfortunately, all too often the parties have not thought about the
matter in precisely those terms, and yet the 'clients' may have relied on
the attorneys to protect their interests in the transaction or proceeding.
- This reliance is particularly notable in cases involving entity-constituent
relations, in which lay individuals typically do not view the entity in the
same abstract manner as do lawyers.

Entity representation is a good example of a situation where there is
inherent, or at least frequent, ambiguity regarding the identification of the
client both by the parties themselves, at the time of the relevant events,
and by the courts, which must reconstruct the significance of these same
8
events at a later time. 0
Even if the entity theory is adopted the lawyer must be careful not to instill irf an
entity constituent the reasonable expectation that the lawyer represents the constituent. The less formal the entity arrangements, the less attention paid to entity
"separateness," and the less legal sophistication of constituents and their awareness of the reasons for "separateness," the easier it will be to find the constituent's
expectation that a lawyer-client relationship existed was reasonable.
While the entity theory possesses the theoretical advantage that the lawyer
will be able to identify his or her client, the reality is that the lawyer cannot place
reliance on that understanding. The lawyer should assume that the constituents
will think "aggregate theory" and any conduct by the lawyer that reinforces that
belief will support a finding that the lawyer has multiple clients rather than a
single client. The entity theory may induce a level of lawyer comfort that is false
and dangerous to the lawyer.
The one advantage that the entity theory may possess over the aggregate
theory is the perception that it enhances the ability of the entity to obtain legal
representation without the need to petition the court. Since under the aggregate
theory the lawyer represents all the partners, at least general partners, conflicts of
interest, either potential or actual, may preclude the lawyer from representing the
aggregate. When the partners secure separate counsel, the interests of the entity
and others in the entity, such as limited partners, employees, and creditors, will
be either unrepresented or separately represented. This idea of conflicting
interests has been the main impediment to expansion of lawyer duty of care to

80. Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of Attorneys to "Non-Clients":Reconceptualizingthe Attorney-

ClientRelationship inEntity Representation and OtherInherently Ambiguous Situations,45 S.C. L. REv. 659,
664-65 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
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non-clients. 8t Yet, even here, the benefit seemingly derived from adopting the

"entity" theory may be more illusory than real. The lawyer for the entity must still
receive instruction from the client. In a two person general partnership with both
partners in disagreement, who speaks for the client? In a five person partnership
does the lawyer treat communications from a majority of the partners as those of
the client, or does the lawyer treat communications from those partners who can
claim a majority percentage of partnership profits as those of the client?8 2 If one
correctly assumes that this issue is of the type that should be resolved by the
partnership agreement, 83 does that not also suggest that the issue of client identity
should be resolved by the partnership or retainer agreement?8 4 That does leave,
however, the problem of what the default rule should be when the parties have
failed to address the issue. At the minimum the default rule should cohere with
the reasonable expectations of the "putative" clients. The formal default rule
adopted by the Responsible Citizens court is unlikely to be appreciated by the

constituent members who will suddenly find themselves without representation
because their lawyer represents their fictional legal entity not them.
Use of the "entity" theory may also induce the lawyer for the entity to be less
cautious in dealing with entity constituents. These constituents will often rely on

the services rendered by the lawyer and may often fail to appreciate the limited
nature of the lawyer's representation. In such a situation a lawyer-client relationship may arise between lawyer and entity constituent, as acknowledged by the
Responsible Citizens court.8 5 Alternatively, a court may find that a fiduciary duty
has been created between the lawyer and the entity's constituents because the
constituents have come
to repose faith, trust, and confidence in the lawyer's
86
advice and judgment.

81. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335,344,556 P.2d 737,742-43, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375,381 (1976),
see id. (finding that if liability is extended to non-clients, an attorney would be too preoccupied with possible
claims to provide the actual client with his or her full attention). See generally Douglas A. Cifu, Expanding
Legal Malpractice to Non-Client Third Parties-At What Cost? 23 CoLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 9-11 (1989).
'82. For example, the five partners may have draws based on the following ownership percentages: A
(10%); B (15%); C (20%); D (25%); E (30%). A, B, and C constitute a numerical majority; D and E a majority
based on partnership interest. If the partnership agreement is silent, who speaks for the partnership?
83. In Formal Opinion 1994-137 the California State Bar Committee on Professional Responsibility
and Competence also emphasized the desirability of a partnership agreement defining how and by whom the
lawyer for the partnership would be instructed. Such a provision would strongly suggest that the constituents
did not intend that the lawyer would represent them individually because control of the lawyer is a fundamental
aspect of the lawyer-client relationship. Cf. Kracht v. Perrin, Gartland & Doyle, 219 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 1023,
268 Cal. Rptr. 637, 640 (1990) (noting that an attorney's duty of undivided loyalty may not be delegated away
and is owed solely to the client). Bifurcating control and representation is a recipe for problems.
84. Cf. Griva v. Davison, 637 A.2d 830, 840 (D.C. App. 1994) (ruling that a unanimous cdnsent
provision in partnership agreement made individual partners "functional" clients of partnership's lawyers).

85. Responsible Citizens, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1731,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 765.
86. The Van Brode Group, Inc. v. Bowditch & Dewey, 633 N.E.2d 424, 428 (Mass. 1994); see Id.
(noting that a lawyer owed fiduciary duty to individual shareholders of close corporation); see also Fassihi v.
Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, P.C., 309 N.W.2d 645, 64849 (Mich. App. 1981) (asserting
that lawyers owed fiduciary duty to co-owner of professional corporation).
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VI. A DIFFERENT SYNTHESIS

The question the Responsible Citizens court should have asked, but didn't, is
whether partnerships and corporations share sufficient structural similarities so
that they should be treated alike or differently for purposes of entity versus aggregate representation. The answer to this question requires that we examine several
related issues. First, we should identify those factors that have caused corporations to be seen as having a separate legal identity, thus justifying the
treatment of the corporate entity as the lawyer's client, distinct from the entity's
constituents, and ascertain whether those same factors exist with respect to
partnerships. Second, we should determine whether the actual practice of business
by partnerships warrants different treatment, for purposes of client identification,
from that afforded corporations. Lastly, and closely connected with point two, we
should determine whether the problem resists resolution by black letter rule and
is more.suitably addressed by a case-by-case approach that acknowledges the

ambiguities of the problem.
A. Separate Legal Entities
Corporations possess a number of characteristics that support their treatment
as the lawyer's client. Under the law, corporations have a recognized legal status

analogous to personhood.8 7 Corporations may: (1) sue and be sued in their own

name;88 (2) own property; 9 (3) pay taxes on corporate income;9 (4) be held
criminally responsible 91 for their wrongs; and (5) assert the lawyer-client privilege

87. For example, the court in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819),
observed that:
Ia] corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.
Being the creature of law, possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers
upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence.... Among the most important are
immortality, and... individuality; properties, by which a perpetual succession of many persons are
considered as the same, and may act as a single individual. They enable a corporation to manage
its own affairs, and to hold property without perplexing intricacies, or the hazardous and endless
necessity, of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand.
Id. at 636.
88. See Kadota Fig Ass'n of Producers v. Case-Swayne Co., 73 Cal. App. 2d 796, 802, 167 P.2d 518,
521 (1946) (holding that a corporation may sue in its own name without compliance with fictitious name

statute).
89.

CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 20001-20002, 21200 (West 1991).

90. I.R.C. § 11 (West 1995). Actually, only the subchapter corporation is taxed as a distinct, separate
legal entity. A corporation may, if it meets certain conditions, elect to be taxed similarly to a partnership. See
generally HARRY J. HAYNESWORTH, SELEcNG THE FORM OF A SMALL BUSNrESS ENTrrY §§ 3:02-03 (1985).
91. See W.T. Grant Co. v. Super. Ct., 23 Cal. App. 3d 284, 100 Cal. Rptr. 179 (1972). See generally
JLED
S. RAKOR , E AL., SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 1.02 (1993) (discussing the history and scope of corporate
criminal liability); Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating CorporateBehavior Through

CriminalSanctions, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1227, 1231-43 (1979).
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on their own behalf.92 The closer a non-corporate legal entity comes to sharing
these attributes, the easier it is to identify that non-corporate entity as having a
separate legal identity that will support a lawyer-client relationship. Unions
possess most of the above characteristics, certainly the significant ones, such as
independent civil and criminal liability, 93 and thus it is not surprising that lawyer-

client relationships between lawyer and union alone are accepted as noncontroversial. 94
Both General and Limited Partnerships share with corporations many of the
characteristics which justify separate legal identification. 95 Some differences can
be noted. For example, partnerships file tax returns but do not pay taxes;96 they
serve as a conduit for income recognition by the partners.97 While partnerships
may be civilly and criminally liable in their own right,98 their liability is not distinct from that of their owners. A corporate owner's personal, vicarious liability
for the wrongs of the corporation is limited to the owner's investment; 99 a
partnership owner's personal, vicarious liability for the wrongs of the partnership
is not limited
to the owner's investment but is coextensive with the partnership's
liability. 100
The fact that partnerships do not share all the attributes of corporations is not
surprising. If there were no differences, there would be little reason to have
different types of legal entities. The issue is not that differences exist but whether
the differences support treating partnerships differently from corporations for

92. See generally2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSEIN's EviDENcE I 503(b)[4],
at 503-59 to 503-93 (1994) (discussing application and scope of attorney-client privilege when a corporation
is the client).
93. See, e.g., Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1403-1411 (1Ith
Cir. 1994)
(holding that a union can be liable for violation of the Racketeering Influenced & Corrupt Organizations
(RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 etseq.)).
94. Anderson v. Tarrington Co., 120 F.R.D. 82, 86 (N.D. Ind. 1987); cf.Yablonski v. United Mine
workers of America, 448 F.2d 1175, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (analogizing union to corporation for client
identification purposes).
95. For example, partnerships may sue and be sued in their own name. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §
369.5(a) (West Supp. 1995).
96. I.R.C. § 6031 (West 1989) and Treas. Regs. § 1.6031-1(a)(2) (1994) require partnerships engaged
in trade in the United States or having income from sources within the United States to file an informational
return.
97. I.R.C. §§ 701-09 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
98. See De Martini v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 90 Cal. App. 2d 139, 149,202 P.2d 828, 835 (1949)
(holding that an action may be brought against apartnership and the judgment binds partnership property). See
generally ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIn, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 4.07(e), at
4:89-92 (1994) (discussing liability of partnerships for damage done in the ordinary course of business).
99. See IA R. BRADBURY CLARK, BALLANTINE & STERLING, CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAWS § 295
(4th ed. 1994) ("A corporation and its shareholders are distinct and separate entities."). See generally Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fishel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,52 U. CI. L. REv. 89 (1985). The
corporation's separateness is subject to the court's equitable power to disregard to prevent fraud or injustice.
See CLARK, supra §§ 296-299 (discussing application and scope of the alterego doctrine).
100. CAL CORP.CODE § 15015(a) (West 1991). For debts and other obligations, the liability of partners
is joint. Id. § 15015(b) (West 1991). For torts and breaches of trust the liability of partners is joint and several.
Id. §§ 15013, 15014, and 15015(a) (West 1991). See generallyBROMBERG & RiSTEIN, supra note 99, § 4.07.
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client identification purposes. Put another way, do partnerships and corporations
share sufficient common attributes to warrant similar treatment for client identity
purposes?
There is no litmus test that allows one to answer the question poised in the
prior paragraph. The fact that partnerships file tax returns but do not pay taxes on
partnership income, whereas corporations do both, does not appear determinative
of the client identity issue. The similarities between corporations and partnerships
severely outweigh any differences. From a purely formal perspective, one would
be hardpressed to justify different treatment of corporations and partnerships on
the client identity issue. To reformulate the argument in Responsible Citizens:0 '
Major Premise: An entity may be identified as a client where it has
a separate legal status analogous to personhood.
Minor Premise: A partnership has a separate legal status analogous
to personhood.
Conclusion:
A partnership may be identified as a client.
B. Public Corporation,Close Corporation,Partnership
Partnerships and corporations do differ in one fundamental aspect that does
justify differential treatment and also explains the split in authority when close
corporations are involved. Modem corporations, particularly modem public
corporations, reflect a separation of ownership and management. 0 2 Those who
speak for the corporate entity (management) do not own the entity (shareholders)
in any meaningful sense. Under such circumstances management interacts with
counsel the same way it would with any independent contractor. The professionalization of management is a reason why management necessarily understands that the lawyer represents the entity, not those employed to manage the
entity.'0 3 It is not surprising that where professional management is not used, for
example in cases involving close corporations, use of the entity representation
rule is most frequently evaded. 104 Whether, in a particular case, a constituent

101. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
102. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932). While the central thesis of Berle and Means, that management is not controlled by the
corporate owners but is self perpetuating, has its critics and defenders, the critical observation of the separation
of management from ownership has not been challenged. See George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying
Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation,1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 884-903.
103. See Meehan v. Hopps, 144 Cal. App. 2d 284,290,301 P.2d 10, 14 (1956).
104. See, e.g., In re Banks, 584 P.2d 284,292 (Or. 1978) ("[l]n closely held family corporations ... the
operator of the corporation either owns or controls the stock in such a manner that it is reasonable to assume
that there is no real reasonfor him to differentiate in his mind between his own and corporateinterests."
[emphasis in original]). See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSmIILIrY, supra note 58, at 221-22 (giving examples where the lawyer for a close corporation

represented the constituents).
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appreciates that she is speaking with the entity's counsel in a representative rather

than individual capacity requires a case-specific analysis. t 5
Although professional management is not alien to partnerships,'06 the more
typical situation involves manager owners, which is similar to the realities of a
close corporation. While close corporations formally fit within the entity model
because they are corporations, the facts often evidence that the formalities of corporate life are not recognized by close corporations.'17 This antagonism between
the rules governing the situation and the realities of the situation have often
resulted in the non-application of the entity rule to a close corporation.' 08
Given the reluctance of courts to apply the entity model to close corporations,
it is somewhat ironic that a court would deem it proper to apply the entity model
to a partnership. The partnership shares fewer characteristics with ihe large, public corporation, upon which Model Rule 1.13 and California Rule 3-600 are so
clearly modeled, than does the close corporation.'9 Indeed, a limited partnership,
where the general partner provides professional management and the limited
partners provide investment capital, bears a closer resemblance to the public

corporatioi with professional management than does the general partnership,
which is more analogous to a close corporation. A more appropriate focus for
courts would be on those characteristics which make it reasonable to treat the

entity as a client. As suggested here, critical characteristics that would satisfy
such treatment should include: (1) Separate legal existence; (2) separate legal
rights and duties; and (3) separation of management from ownership. Such an
approach would harmonize and reconcile the public and close corporation cases.
0

105. Compare Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schools, 43 F.3d 1373, 1384-85 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding no
reasonable basis for Cole's belief that the school district's law firm represented her when she consulted with
law firm only for purpose of carrying out her duties as a principal) with E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F.
Supp. 371, 389-91 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (holding that a corporate employee held an objectively reasonable belief
based on his interactions with corporate counsel that counsel was representing the employee individually along
with the entity).
106. For example, law firms which are usually organized as partnerships have increasingly come under
professional management. E.g., LARRY SMrrH, THE BustNEss OF LAW-A HANDBOOK ON How TO MANAGE

LAW FIRMS (1992). Limited partnerships may be formed where the limited partners contribute the capital to
purchase the business or assets that will be "managed" by the general partners for the benefit of the partnership.
A partnership or corporation may be directed by sophisticated management or by its owners, who in turn may
be sophisticated or unsophisticated about their own and their entity's relationship with counsel. Generalizations
are dangerous, particularly when based on assumptions drawn from a diverse data pool.
107. See supra note 25.
108. This distinction is also reflected in the new limited liability company (LLC) entity. See supra note
32. LLC's appear in two forms, member-managed and manager-managed. It is easier to envision a managermanaged LLC as qualifying for entity representation status than a member-managed LLC because we may
expect that managers, better than owners, appreciate that counsel represents the entity, not the constituents of
the entity. Robert B. Keatings, New Gang in Town Liability Companies: An Introduction, 4 BUS. L. TODAY
5 (MarJApr. 1995).
109. The informality of the conduct of close corporation business resulted in specific acknowledgment
in the California Corporations Code. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(e) (West 1990) ("The failure of a close
corporation to observe corporate formalities relating to the meetings of directors or shareholders in connection
with the management of its affairs... shall not be considered a factor tending to establish that the shareholders
have personal liability for corporate obligations.").
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It would also suggest the general inappropriateness of using the entity test as an
exclusive test for partnership representation purposes.

C. Rule or Case-By-Case Approach
Because the consequences of client misidentification can be severe, both to
the lawyer and the "clients," there is a temptation to prefer a "rules" approach
over case-by-case analysis. In many instances the preference for "rules" is well
justified. Relegating the determination of client identity to case-by-case and issueby-issue resolution may prejudice those involved. Harm may be incurred before
the relationship is authoritatively determined because the lawyer incorrectly
evaluates an ambiguous situation and treats a client as a non-client. Uncertainty
may also encourage lawyers and "clients" to structure their relationships based
on their immediate, short-term needs rather than their long-term needs. It is true
that ordinarily the parties are best positioned to determine their own needs; yet,
in many cases, "best decision making" requires information that may be beyond
the ability of the parties to acquire due to financial restraints, lack of knowledge
or time, or other constraints. Well crafted and well reasoned rules can eliminate
those costs and attempt to predict the rule reasonable parties would adopt if they
were fully aware of their short- and long-term goals and needs. Case-by-case
determinations should thus be seen as a default rule, to be used where the circumstances prevent rule development or where the proper resolution of the issue
is necessarily and inevitably fact specific.
The exception to decision making by rule applies here. A rule which focuses
simply on the formal structure of the entity is both over- and underinclusive. It
treats those characteristics that define the formal structure of the entity as necessarily defining who should be the "client" for purposes of the lawyer-client

relationship. Putting aside the absence of any evidence that the issues of entity
structure and client identification are sufficiently alike to warrant similar treatment, the close corporation cases clearly evidence the unwillingness, of courts to
adopt and apply a rule which assumes universal equivalency between the two
issues.
We could reformulate the rule to incorporate the entity characteristics that I
contend more correctly define when an entity should be deemed a client, namely
separate management. Such an approach, however, would be disadvantageous for
at least two reasons. First, such a rule is really not a rule; its terms are much too
ambiguous to have meaningful application in a formal sense. How separate from
ownership or control must management be? Is separation a formal or evidentiary
test? The close corporation cases suggest that the real test is fact sensitive and
depends on the relationship that actually exists between the corporate managers
and counsel. Such an approach defies reduction to rule prescription.
The second objection is the more direct. Separate management cannot be seen
as the sole, exclusive determinant of entity status as a client. The issue is not so
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much separate management as the professionalization of management and management's recognition of its role. Management's role is to serve the entity, not
itself. Management's use of counsel is necessarily undertaken within the context
of and subject to management's role. Counsel is retained by management, notfor
management. Is such an awareness the exclusive preserve of the large public
corporation? Many non-public corporations, both large and small, are no doubt
owner-managed by individuals who are aware that when acting on behalf of the
corporate entity they act directly for it and only indirectly for themselves. Would
retained counsel in such circumstances represent only the entity? It would seem
that professionalization and sophistication can be attributes of both managers and
owners. The critical issue is whether these attributes exist. We can assume they
exist when we confront separately managed corporations, but there is no basis for
presuming they do or do not exist, sufficiently to justify a rule, when we deal with
the non-public corporation.
It is the presumption of a lack of professionalism that drives the current
debate. Competent counsel will always, in the retainer agreement, identify who
is the client and by their conduct preclude non-clients from forming reasonable
expectations that they are being represented by counsel. Since the lawyer-client
relationship is, at root, one of contract, the contract both affirmatively states who
the client is and by negative inference defeats claims that an individual had a reasonable expectation that a lawyer-client relationship existed between the lawyer
and the individual. The need for a rule arises in those situations where by default
the lawyer has not acted positively to discourage individuals from reasonably
believing that they are a party to a lawyer-client relationship. Yet, it strains
credulity that in such cases the layperson should be directed to a Rule of
Professional Responsibility that says the entity is the client. And, in fact, no such
direction would be attempted since the individual's "reasonable expectations" that
a lawyer-client relationship existed would trump the Rule's contrary suggestion,

a reality acknowledged by the Responsible Citizens court." 0
What service then does the entity rule provide that is not provided by a
competently drafted retainer agreement? Is it designed to bail out lawyers who
fail to use properly drafted retainers or who allow individuals to form expectations counter to those set forth in the retainer? If that is the intent of the rule, it
is ill defined as a rule of "professional" conduct. Is it designed to provide counsel
with leverage that can be applied if management acts, or requests counsel's
assistance, in ways that ill serve the interests of the entity? Portions of the entity
rule as codified in the Professional Code certainly suggest that this may be the
case, at least in part."' Yet, if this is a reason for the rule, the reason has little

110. Responsible Citizens, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1731-32, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 764-65.
111. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3-600(B)-(C) (1988); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b)-(c) (1983).
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application to close corporations and partnerships where no separation exists
between owners and managers and only a fiction separates entity and owners.
It may be argued that the "organization as client" rule prevents unreasonable
application of the all-but-mandatory disqualification of counsel that occurs when
counsel concurrently represents clients with opposing interests."t2 Certainly there

is language in Responsible Citizens that suggests this concern motivated the court.
The court appeared to view the automatic disqualification rule as more grounded
in abstraction than practical wisdom.1 3 Surely this might be true in the ease of an
organization with professional or sophisticated management where the person
who speaks for the client may be assumed to understand that the lawyer represents the entity, not the entity's employee. One must question whether the same
assumption holds where professional, sophisticated management is absent. Does
treatment of the partnership as the client in Responsible Citizens make it possible
for the general partner to work with counsel when counsel is at the same time
representing a client who is suing the general partner? For that matter should
counsel be speaking with the general partner?"
VII. CONCLUSION

With respect to close corporations and partnerships, the critical issue is what
default rule should be applied when a lawyer has failed to clarify in the retainer
who is and who is not a client. While there is little argument that the close corporation or partnership should be capable of separate representation, the critical
question is whether that should be the presumed rule where the retainer agreement
is silent. In the absence of sophistication on the part of the entity's constituents
who deal with the lawyer and whose knowledge and experience may support a
presumption that they are aware, or should be aware, that the lawyer represents
only the entity, the presumption, if a presumption is needed, should be that the
lawyer represents the constituents who speak for the entity. Such a presumption
better correlates with the realities of the world and good rules should reflect that
reality-not ignore it. The lawyer, not the client, should bear the burden of
ensuring that no ambiguity or uncertainty exists with respect to who is and is not

a client.

112. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3-310 (1988); MODEL RULES OF

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(a) (1983). It is for this reason that a lawyer may attempt to "fire" the client
so as to escape the "current client" conflict rules for the less encompassing "former client" conflict rules.
Usually this tactic is unsuccessful. See, e.g., Truck Ins. Exch. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 6 Cal. App. 4th 1050,
8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 228 (1992).
113. Responsible Citizens, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 1725, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760-61; see id. (noting concern
over tactical and strategic use of motions to disqualify based on alleged "conflicts of interest").
114. See CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2-100 (1988); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (1983). Both Rules prohibit a lawyer from communicating with a
represented party without the consent of that party's lawyer.
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It may be readily conceded that deeming a lawyer for an entity also to be the
lawyer for all the constituent owners of the partnership entity is unwise. Some
partnerships are very large and diverse. Particularly in the limited partnership
context, conflicts between entrepreneurial general partners and investor limited

partners may be frequent and inherent in the relationship. Telling the lawyer that
all the owners are her clients is as misguided as the current rule approach that
tells the lawyer that only the entity is her client.
A rule cannot cover all situations, and that cannot be the measure of a rule
otherwise no rule would qualify. A rule must, however, on balance do more good
than harm. The first question must always be, "is a rule necessary?" Here I
believe the answer is no, except to the extent the rule says that an entity can be a
client. Client-lawyer relationships should be left to the parties and it is this point
that the rule should emphasize. A rule that suggests the client-lawyer relationship
is predetermined by law father than by the parties' intent or conduct is surely a
trap for the unwary. Nor is the trap undone by caveats contained in the boilerplate
of the rule or in ethics opinions which suggest to lawyers representing entities that
they must be careful in their relationships with entity constituents. No more than
in insurance policies are such exceptions to the general rule likely to be read.
Traps for the unwary lawyer do not belong in the Rules of. Professional
Conduct; rather the rules should provide good counsel and guidance to lawyers.
The entity-only rule fails that standard.

